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Biggs and Ade: Income Tax Deduction of Educational Expenses
NOTES

tunately, Florida is one of this number, as exemplified by the statement in the Davis case that the transfer will not be set aside unless
the challenging wife was the particular one the transferor intended
to defraud. It is somewhat surprising that so few of these cases have
arisen in Florida in view of the ever-increasing number of retired
people moving into the state. Thus, with the likelihood that many
such cases lurk in the future, it is to be hoped that the Florida Court
will continue its tendency toward relaxing this rule.
WM. TERRELL HODGES

INCOME TAX DEDUCTION OF EDUCATIONAL EXPENSES
Section 162 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 allows a
deduction for "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business . . . ." To be deductible under this section the expense must
have been "incurred" by an accrual basis taxpayer, or actually paid
by a cash basis taxpayer 2 within the taxable year. This requirement
is not a determining factor as to whether an expense is deductible;
rather it determines the taxable year in which the deduction may be
taken. The requirement simply refers to the accounting method
employed by the taxpayer; it does not allow him an election as to
the year of deductibility.
Neither the code nor the regulations attempt to define the "carrying on any trade or business" requirement of the code, and the cases
lead only to the conclusion that what is meant by this phrase is
dependent upon the facts of each situation. 3 It has been held that
even the holding of a single piece of rental property may constitute
a trade or business. 4 However, in Higgins v. Commissioners the Su'Noxon Chemical Prod. Co. v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 871 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,

296 U.S. 647 (1935).

2Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 269 (1933); J. H.
Martinus & Sons v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1940).
sStoddard v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944); Henry G. Owen, 23 T.C.
377 (1954); Frank B. Polachek, 22 T.C. 858 (1954).
4Leland Hazard, 7 T.C. 372 (1946).

5312 U.S. 212

(1941).
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preme Court said that numerous trading activities in securities did
not constitute a trade or business.
In addition to the requirement that the expense must be paid or
incurred within the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business
of the taxpayer, to be deductible it must also be both "ordinary and
necessary." An expense is "necessary" if appropriate and helpful in
developing or maintaining the taxpayer's trade or business. In Welsh
v. Helvering6 the United States Supreme Court merely assumed the
expenses to be necessary. No cases have been found in which the
expense determined to be ordinary has been disallowed on the ground
that it was not necessary.
To be ordinary, the expenditure need only be usual in relation
to the particular business of the taxpayer; it need not be habitual or
normal in the sense that the taxpayer will have to make it often.T
In the Welsh case the Supreme Court said that there is no "verbal
formula that will supply a ready touchstone" and that the statutory
standard "is not a rule of law; it is rather a way of life. Life in all
its fullness must supply the answer to the riddle."8
Until recently the Treasury Department 9 and the courts' 0 had
held that educational expenses incurred in maintaining or increasing
one's professional skill or knowledge were not deductible under the
predecessors of section 162 (a).'1 In most instances these expenditures
were disallowed as being either personal 12 or capital- in nature.
HISTORY OF EDUCATIONAL DEDUCTION

As early as 1921 the Treasury Department announced its basic
policy as to the deductibility of educational expenses by stating: "The
expenses incurred by school-teachers in attending summer school are
in the nature of personal expenses incurred in advancing their education and are not deductible in computing net income.' 14 In the
6290 U.S. 111 (1933).
'Western Maryland Dairy Corp. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 769 (1935).
s290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
9O.D. 892,4 CuM. BULL. 209 (1921); Treas. Reg. 111, §29.23 (a)-15 (1943).
'OE.g., Robert M. Kamins, 25 T.C. 1238 (1956); Knut F. Larson, 15 T.C. 956
(1950); T. F. Driscoll, 4 B.T.A. 1008 (1926).
"E.g., Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §23 (a).
"2E.g., Fred A. DeCain, 20 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 535 (1951); T. F. Driscoll, 4
B.T.A. 1008 (1926). See also INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §262.
13E.g., James M. Osborn, 3 T.C. 603 (1944).
140.D. 892, 4 Cum. BULL. 209 (1921).
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same year the Government also announced that "expenses incurred
by doctors in taking post-graduate courses are deemed to be in the
nature of personal expenses and not deductible."'15 The Board of
Tax Appeals in 1926 followed this policy by denying a loss deduction for expenses incurred in preparation for a career as a singer,
which the taxpayer had to abandon on the advice of a physician. 6
The Commissioner had held the expenses to be educational and
therefore personal in nature.
It was not until 1950, in Hill v. Comniissioner,'1 that the first
deviation from this long-established policy occurred. In this landmark decision a public school teacher holding the highest certificate
issued by the State Board of Education was required to have a certificate in full force to maintain her teaching position. To keep this
certificate in force, she was required either to pass an examination on
five books selected from a reading list or to present evidence of
college credit earned. When she followed the latter course and deducted the expense incurred in obtaining these college credits at
summer school, the court held that this expense was a deductible
business expense. The basic treasury ruling, O.D. 892,18 was expressly
not overruled but was held to be not applicable when summer school
attendance was necessary for "carrying on" and "preserving" the
present position of the taxpayer.
The Treasury Department accepted the holding and modified
O.D. 892 in the light of that decision. Its reluctance to open the
gates to a flood of educational expense deductions is evidenced, however, by its seizing upon the limitations of the Hill case to rule that
not "all teachers attending summer school may deduct their expenses
as 'ordinary and necessary business expenses.' "19 The expenses incurred in obtaining a teaching position; qualifying for permanent
status, a higher position, or an advance in salary; or fulfilling the
teacher's general cultural aspirations were still deemed to be personal
expenses and not deductible in determining taxable income.
The Tax Court seemed to share the reluctance of the Treasury
Department to expand the area of allowable educational expense deductions. Immediately after the Hill case, the Tax Court in Knut F.
150.D. 984, 5 CuM. BULL. 171 (1921).
'ST. F. DriscoHl, 4 B.TA. 1008 (1926).
'7181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950).
184 CuM. BuLL. 209 (1921).
291.T. 4044, 1951-1 CuM. BuLL. 16, 17.
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Larson20 refused to allow deduction of a mechanic's expenses of attending night school to acquire an engineering degree. The court
called "learning" a capital asset and held that it was not an ordinary
business expense. The case, however, was distinguished from Hill v.
Commissioner in that the education was for the purpose of commencing a new vocation and obtaining a new position rather than for
continuing a career in an existing position. In another case 21 a college professor deducted expenses incurred in connection with his
doctor's dissertation, although the degree was not required in order
to hold his current position. The Tax Court disallowed the expense
as not "necessary."
The Tax Court seemingly took a step back from the Hill decision
in disallowing the educational expenses of obtaining a doctorate degree when a taxpayer was temporarily employed as a research associate and was required to obtain the degree for permanent employment. 2 2 Such expenses were held to be clearly for "commencing" and
"increasing," not for "carrying on" and "preserving," a profession.
In Marlor v. Commissioner23 the court of appeals reversed a similar
Tax Court decision involving substantially the same circumstances.
The appellate court accepted the dissent in the Tax Court opinion,
which contended that even though the expense may have been incurred for a dual purpose, the immediate objective was to retain the
24
taxpayer's current position.

At the time that Hill v. Commissioner was decided, it was considered a great stride forward in allowing the deduction of educational expenses. A careful examination shows that in actuality the
decision was accepted narrowly and with great reluctance to expand
it in any direction. The Tax Court continued to show a strong distaste for educational expense deductions by holding them to be personal25 or capital26 in nature, and never hesitated to distinguish the

Hill case or to limit its rule to the facts of that situation.27 Also it
freely applied the distinction between "commencing" or "increasing"
2015 T.C. 956 (1950).

2"Richard Henry Lamkin, 21 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 507 (1952).
22Robert M. Kamins, 25 T.C. 1238 (1956).
23251 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1958).
24Clark S. Maror, 27 T.C. 624, 626 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
"Manoel Cardozo, 17 T.C. 3 (1951); Samuel W. Marshall, 24 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
797 (1955).
26Knut F. Larson, 15 T.C. 956 (1950).
27Ibid.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol11/iss3/5

4

Biggs and Ade: Income Tax Deduction of Educational Expenses
NOTES
and "carrying on" or "preserving."2 8 Similarly, the Treasury Department's caution in the field was probably due to its fear of what a broad
acceptance of the case might lead to.
A more lenient attitude toward educational deductions was in29
dicated in 1957 when the Tax Court in a memorandum decision
allowed the deduction of expenses incurred by a taxpayer whose
school attendance was required in order to renew her teaching certificate. Similar expenses incurred by the taxpayer's husband were
held to be for the purpose of obtaining a new position and therefore
not allowed.
A further liberalization was evidenced by the Tax Court when the
fact that the courses taken could be used as credit toward the earning
of a graduate degree was held to be only incidental. 30 Here the teacher
attended summer school at the direction of her employer for the purpose of maintaining her senior salary position.
Shortly after these two 1957 Tax Court cases were decided, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided Marlor v. Commissioner, discussed above. This case further illustrates the more lenient attitude of the courts toward deductions of educational expenses.
REGULATIONS

The proposed regulations under the 1954 code2 ' promulgated by
the Treasury Department in July, 1956, were little more than a summary statement of prior decisions and rulings on the deduction for
educational expense. The general proposition set forth was that such
expenditures are personal and not deductible.32
An exception was made for situations in which the degree of
business necessity clearly outweighed any personal aspect of the expenditure and the expenses were ordinary and necessary for the
maintenance of the taxpayer's employment, trade, or business. This
provision covered the expenses of "refresher" or similar courses necessary to maintain, but not advance, the skills possessed by the taxpayer
in his trade or business. The fact that a course carried academic
credit, was of long duration, or was designed for persons preparing
to enter a trade or business weighed against its being of the "refresher"
2SRobert M. Kamins, 25 T.C. 1238 (1956).
29William. E. Thompson, 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 229 (1957).
aORobert S. Green, 28 T.C. 1155 (1957).
3121 Fed. Reg. 5091 (1956).
S2Proposed Treas. Reg. §1.162-5 (a) (1).
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type. Expenses incurred for education undertaken as a requisite to
retention of the taxpayer's position or salary under an express requirement of his employer were recognized as being deductible. However,
expenses were not deductible if in more than an incidental or minor
manner 33 they would aid the taxpayer to obtain a different position,
to qualify for employment, to enhance his business reputation, or
otherwise to advance substantially in salary, status, or position.
When the final regulations were published in April, 1958,34 a
major change of Treasury Department policy and a broadening of
the deductibility of educational expense became evident. The general
tenor of the final regulations is that educational expenses are deductible under certain circumstances, as compared with the tenor of
the proposed regulations, under which such expenses were personal
and not deductible except under certain conditions.
Under the final regulations the deduction is allowed if the expense is incurred in "maintaining or improving skills required by
the taxpayer in his employment or other trade or business."3 A deduction will be allowed under this section if it is customary for established members of the trade or business to undertake such education.
An expense is also deductible if incurred to meet the express requirements of the taxpayer's employer when training is imposed as
a condition for retention of the taxpayer's salary level, status, or
employment. This deduction is limited to the expenses necessary for
the minimum education required by the employer. However, any
excess may be deducted under the "maintaining or improving skills"
section if the requirements of that provision are met.
The final regulations, as well as the proposed, disallow a deduction for educational expenses undertaken primarily for the purpose
of obtaining a new position, or for a substantial advancement in
position, or for fulfilling the general educational aspirations of the
taxpayer. Expenditures for travel as a form of education are considered primarily personal in nature and therefore are not deductible,
but expenses for travel, meals, and lodging incurred while away from
home primarily to obtain an education may qualify for a deduction
on the same basis as any other expense of the education.
On the other hand, if the travel is primarily personal, with the
33Proposed Treas. Reg. §1.162-5 (d).
34T.D. 6291, 1958 INT. REv. BULL. No. 16 at 8.
35

Treas. Reg. §1.162-5 (a)(1) (1958).
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deductible educational activity only incidental, the taxpayer is allowed to deduct only the expenses of meals and lodging during the
time spent in such allowable educational activities, and no portion
of his travel expenses is deductible. This provision is a change from
the proposed regulations, which disallowed all meals and lodging
expense regardless of the fact that some time was spent in otherwise
allowable educational pursuits. Expenses incurred while engaging
in personal activities, such as sightseeing, social visiting, entertaining,
or other recreation, are nondeductible personal or living expenses. In
accordance with long-established principle, expenses incurred in the
nature of commuter's fares are nondeductible personal expense.3 6
EMPLOYEE VERSUS SELF-EMPLOYED

In a letter to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
Secretary of the Treasury Anderson said that the new regulations
remove differences in treatment of educational expenses between employed and self-employed teachers.3 7 This is true to the extent that
both classes of taxpayers are now allowed to deduct expenses that
carry academic credit or result in salary increases or promotion if
they otherwise meet the requirements as to deductibility.
There does remain, however, a distinction between these two
classes. It arises not from the allowance of the educational deduction
but from the different methods of deducting expenses to arrive at
taxable income. In computing adjusted gross income, a taxpayer
is allowed to deduct expenses only to the extent that they fall within
one of the enumerated categories of section 62 of the Internal Revenue Code. For this purpose a deduction is allowed for all expenses
attributable to a trade or business if the taxpayer is self-employed or
if the taxpayer is an employee and the expenses incurred are reimbursed.38 This section allows to a self-employed professional person a deduction for arriving at adjusted gross income of all allowable
educational expense but expressly denies such a deduction to an employee. The trade or business deductions of an employee are allowed
in computing adjusted gross income only to the extent that they are
reimbursed by his employer (of little use to most educators), or for
expenses of travel while away from home, such as transportation,
36Treas. Reg. §1.162-5 (d) (1958).
37P-H FED. TAx SEv. 154,846.
SBINT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, §62 (a) (1).
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meals, and lodging. Any expenses incurred for books, tuition, supplies, and the like would have to be utilized as a deduction from adjusted gross income. 39
On a theoretical plane this distinction hardly seems to be of major
significance. But in practice it means that a self-employed taxpayer
will be allowed to deduct all of his educational expenses in addition
to taking the optional standard deduction. For an employee who is
not reimbursed to deduct all of his allowable educational expenses,
however, he will have to itemize his deductions in lieu of taking the
optional standard deduction. This simply means that unless an
employee can profit by not taking the standard deduction, without
taking into consideration his educational expenses, which are not
allowed in arriving at adjusted gross income, he is not receiving the
same tax-saving benefit as the self-employed taxpayer.
PROFESSIONS OTHER THAN TEACHING

Although the cases dealing with educational expense deductions
have primarily involved teachers and educators, and most of the
publicity given the new regulations has been aimed at informing the
teaching profession of the advantages that are now available for expenditures incurred for educational purposes, the regulations and the
accompanying advantages are by no means limited to that profession.
The regulations themselves give examples involving an accountant, 40
a physician, 41 and a tax consultant.42
As early as 1953 an appellate court allowed a deduction for tuition,
travel, board, and lodging expenses incurred by an established lawyer
while attending the Fifth Annual Institute on Federal Taxation sponsored by New York University.43 The Tax Court had disallowed the
deduction because of the educational and personal nature of the object of the taxpayer. In a 1956 decision, a deduction was also allowed
for educational expenses incurred by a lawyer while attending the
4
Practicing Law Institute. 4
Cases arose prior to the Treasury's shift in policy in which the

39William E. Thompson, 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 229 (1957).
4
OTreas. Reg. §1.162-5 (e), Example (1) (1958).
411d. Example (2).
421d. Example (8).
43Coughlin v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1953).
44Bistline v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Idaho 1956).
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